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Abstract: By applying regression analysis to data from the 
2010 Latin American Public Opinion Project’s “AmericasBarometer” 
surveys, this paper examines the correlates of citizen support for 
democracy in Venezuela� Special attention is paid to evaluations 
of current economic conditions, satisfaction with the functioning 
of democracy and trust in the President as potential explanatory 
variables� The analysis of the models reveals at least two concep-
tions of democracy present among Venezuelans, which are strongly 
influenced by the degree of trust in the President citizens feel� The 
findings suggest the need of studying support for democracy through 
more complex scopes, in order to acquire better understandings of 
citizens’ attitudes towards their political systems�
Keywords: support for democracy, trust in the President, 
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resumen: Mediante la aplicación de análisis de regresión a 
datos de las encuestas “AmericasBarometer” del 2010, este artí-
culo examina las fuentes de apoyo ciudadano a la democracia en 
Venezuela� Atención especial es prestada a las evaluaciones del 
estado de la economía, satisfacción con el funcionamiento de la 
democracia y confianza en el Presidente como potenciales variables 
explicativas� El análisis de los modelos permite ver por lo menos dos 
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for Survey Methodology (RECSM − www�upf�edu/survey)� He carries 
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concepciones de democracia presentes entre los venezolanos, que 
son fuertemente influidas por el nivel de confianza en el Presidente 
que los ciudadanos sienten� Los resultados sugieren la necesidad de 
estudiar el apoyo a la democracia a través de enfoques más complejos, 
con el objetivo de obtener mejores comprensiones de las actitudes 
ciudadanas hacia sus sistemas políticos�
Palabras clave: apoyo a la democracia, confianza en el 
Presidente, Venezuela, Hugo Chávez
Introduction
Understanding citizens’ attitudes towards their politi-
cal systems is a matter of utmost importance for students 
of democratization� Among the primary concerns of the 
studies in this area is the monitoring of popular support 
for democracy� Generalized support for democratic rule 
has been regarded by many scholars as a healthy charac-
teristic of a democracy (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Dalton, 
1999, 2004; Diamond & Morlino, 2004; Easton, 1975; Fuchs, 
Guidorossi, & Svensson, 1995; Linz, 1978; Linz & Stepan, 
1996; Lipset, 1959, 1994)� In this sense, unconditional sup-
port for democracy -support which is stable through time 
and held under any circumstance- has been argued to be a 
guarantee of stability for any democratic regime� As Russell 
Dalton has put it, “a democratic political system requires 
a reservoir of diffuse support independent of immediate 
policy outputs if it is to weather periods of public dissat-
isfaction” (1999: 59)�
Important differences have been found between ad-
vanced and developing democracies regarding their citi-
zens’ commitments to the ideal of democracy (Lagos, 2003a; 
Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 2001)� Advanced 
democracies are characterized by majoritarian and stable 
citizen support for democratic rule� In these nations, citizens 
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might be dissatisfied with the functioning of the political 
system, and even disenchanted with politics in general, but 
will still tend to maintain preferences for democratic rule 
over other forms of government (Dalton, 1999, 2004; Norris, 
1999)� Support for democracy here is not affected by short-
term fluctuations in the economy or the political scenario: 
it is a long-lasting attitude that does not change with ease� 
The situation in newly-established or developing democra-
cies is quite different� In these contexts, citizen support for 
democratic rule has been found to vary significantly across 
countries and through time� There is evidence that citizens 
in many young democracies will change their preferences 
for democratic rule with ease, being significantly influenced 
by economic and political events (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; 
Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2008)� 
Having in mind these differences between advanced 
and developing democracies, this article seeks to examine 
the correlates of citizen support for democracy in Venezuela� 
It does so by looking at the relationship between democratic 
support and variables that tap citizens’ evaluations of the 
current state of affairs in their country, concentrating on 
evaluations of both the economical and political spheres� 
Is support for democracy in Venezuela unconditional? Or 
are citizens subduing their preferences for democracy to 
factors such as evaluations of the economy or the political 
situation?
Special attention is paid to the role of citizen trust in 
their President as a possible explanatory variable� Does 
trust in Hugo Chávez have an effect in Venezuelans’ sup-
port for democracy? One of the interests driving this ar-
ticle is to find out if the presence of a highly controversial 
President may influence citizen support for democracy� 
Hugo Chávez is (even if deceased) a charismatic figure who 
has concentrated most of the attention when it comes to 
debates about Venezuelan politics in the last decade� Very 
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strong -and opposed- positions are held regarding him, 
both inside Venezuela and in the rest of the world� Being 
so salient in the Venezuelan political scenario, do attitudes 
towards him affect citizens’ attitudes towards democratic 
rule in any way?2
Political support and its measurement
Most research concentrating on citizens’ attitudes to-
wards political systems has departed from David Easton’s 
ideas on political support� More than forty years ago, Easton 
put forward the idea that political support should be con-
sidered a multidimensional concept (Easton, 1965, 1975)� 
He originally coined a dual conceptualization of support 
that could account both for evaluations of authorities’ 
performance (‘specific’ support) and for attitudes towards 
more basic and fundamental aspects of the political system 
(‘generalized’ or ‘diffuse’ support)� “Support is not all of a 
piece,” he argued, and its constituent classes could vary 
independently from each other (1975: 437)� 
On the one hand, Easton defines ‘specific’ support 
as the type related to the “satisfactions that members of 
a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and 
performance of the political authorities” (1975: 437)� It 
may include both evaluations according to the extent to 
which citizen demands have been met and evaluations 
tapping perceived general performance of the system and 
its authorities� It is, by definition, conditional on perceived 
benefits and satisfactions� Generalized, or ‘diffuse’ support, 
2 At the time this article was originally written, Hugo Chávez was still alive 
and holding the Presidential Office in Venezuela� Despite the recent 
changes in the Venezuelan political scenario, the influence Chávez 
continues to have in Venezuelan politics is undeniable� It is thus safe 
to assume that the relevance of this article remains unchanged�
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on the other hand, is related to the “evaluations of what an 
object is or represents −to the general meaning it has for a 
person− not of what it does” (1975: 444)� This type of support 
has been related to the “affective” orientations citizens have 
towards political systems (Almond & Verba, 1963; Dalton, 
2004; Norris, 1999)� Generalized support is more durable 
and shows fewer fluctuations than specific support, and 
is normally independent of outputs and performance in 
the short run� It is the “reservoir of favorable attitudes” 
(Easton, 1975: 444) that allows members of a system ac-
cept or tolerate policy outputs to which they are opposed 
while maintaining esteem for the democratic principles�
The original idea of Easton was that people who showed 
‘diffuse’ support for a political system would in general 
accept the authorities chosen through it� But they could 
also lose trust in these authorities and be dissatisfied with 
the functioning of their system while maintaining support 
for its fundamental principles� ‘Diffuse’ support and low 
levels of ‘specific’ support can live together: up to a certain 
threshold, they appear to be not strongly related� And as 
Easton himself proposes, “it is the unpredictability of the 
relationship between political dissatisfaction and tension 
on the one hand and the acceptance of basic political ar-
rangements on the other that constitutes a persistent puzzle 
for research” (1975: 437)�
While the basic distinction of political support into 
‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ has gained widespread acceptance 
among academics, no agreement has been achieved in 
terms of the proper way to assess it through empirical 
research� Different understandings of Easton’s ideas have 
led to a variety of schemes, approaches and indicators 
designed to study the nature and structure of political 
support� Discussions regarding which indicators are more 
appropriate for measuring both ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ sup-
port date back to the 1970’s, when authors debated whether 
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the increasing levels of discontent shown in surveys in the 
United States reflected attitudes towards the incumbents 
or towards the democratic regime in general (Citrin, 1974; 
Miller, 1974)� Forty years later the debate is still open: in-
dicators which have been used to measure both types of 
support have been strongly and recurrently criticized� There 
is no academic agreement on how exactly Easton’s theory 
should be interpreted or empirically tested�
In democratic systems, when seeking to asses Easton’s 
‘diffuse’ support, political analysts have heavily relied on 
the concept of ‘support for democracy’� Two standard ques-
tions have been frequently used in public opinion surveys 
in the last thirty years to monitor this concept� The first 
one, derived from Churchill’s famous dictum about de-
mocracy, asks citizens to agree or disagree with the state-
ment “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than 
any other form of government”3 (Booth & Seligson, 2005; 
Dalton, 2004; Huang, Chang, & Chu, 2008; Inglehart, 2003; 
Klingemann, 1999; Seligson, 2007)� The second one builds 
on Juan Linz’s theorizing on democratic breakdown, and 
asks respondents with which of the following statements do 
they “most agree”: (a) “Democracy is preferable to any other 
form of government”, (b) “Under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian government could be preferable to a demo-
cratic one” or (c) “To people like me, it is the same to have 
a democratic or non-democratic regime” (Bratton, 2002; 
Fuchs et al., 1995; Lagos, 2003a, 2008; Linz & Stepan, 1996; 
Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006)� Most 
3  The complete quote attributed to Churchill is: “Many forms of Gover-
nment have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe� 
No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise� Indeed, it has 
been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time”� Sir Winston 
Churchill, from a speech in the House of Commons given on November 
11th, 1947�
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research that has used both of these ‘classic’ indicators 
for measuring support for democracy has assumed that 
they capture unconditional −‘diffuse’− beliefs about the 
superiority of democracy�
In an important contribution, Mishler and Rose (2001) 
argue that measuring democratic support in what they label 
‘incomplete’ democracies is better achieved through a dif-
ferent kind of approach, which they call ‘realist’� This view 
differs from the traditional −‘idealist’− approach in that 
it “avoids abstract, ambiguous and idealistic labels such 
as democracy” (2001: 307)� Mishler and Rose argue that 
‘realist’ measures of support are superior to ‘idealist’ ones 
in several respects: they tap ‘real’ attitudes, have greater 
face validity, and have greater generality (2001: 315)� An 
example of a question belonging to the ‘realist’ approach 
would ask citizens about their attitudes to their ‘political 
system’, avoiding in that sense the bias that introducing 
a term like ‘democracy’ could produce in their answers�
When it comes to the assessment of Easton’s ‘specific’ 
support, political analysts have repeatedly relied on the 
concept of ‘satisfaction with the functioning of democracy’� 
This concept has traditionally been measured through 
one ‘classical’ indicator: most of the important survey 
programs around the world (American National Election 
Studies, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European 
Social Survey, AmericasBarometers, Latinobarómetro, 
Afrobarometer) use variations of the following question: 
“How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
(country)?”, and most of them include a four point unipolar 
scale with the categories ‘very satisfied’, ‘fairly satisfied’, ‘not 
very satisfied’ and ‘not at all satisfied’ as possible answers� 
Answers to this question have shown to be strongly related 
to economic fluctuations and political events, and to rapidly 
change in time� In this sense, they have been said to tap 
‘specific’ political support�
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Support for democracy: advanced 
vs. developing democracies
Since the worldwide spread of democratic regimes in 
the 1970’s, a considerable amount of research has been 
dedicated to understanding the sources of citizen support 
for democracy, both in advanced and developing democ-
racies� Despite the great efforts deployed in explaining 
the individual level factors that influence citizens’ prefer-
ences for democratic rule, no clear consensus has been 
achieved among scholars� Explanations have stressed the 
roles of early socialization processes (Easton & Dennis, 
1967; Inglehart, 2003), interpersonal trust and social capi-
tal (Putnam, 1993), institutional arrangements (Mattes & 
Bratton, 2007; Norris, 1999), or the performance of demo-
cratic institutions and leaders (Evans & Whitefield, 1995; 
Whitefield & Evans, 1999)� While all of these factors have 
been shown to play a role, the variation of their influence 
across contexts has been significant and few sound conclu-
sions have been reached�
Recent literature has shown that there are important 
differences between advanced and developing democracies 
regarding citizens’ commitments to the ideal of democracy 
(Lagos, 2003a; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 
2001)� Advanced democracies are characterized by the pres-
ence of a vast majority of citizens who agree that democracy 
is the best and always preferable political arrangement� 
Aggregate levels of democratic support reported in most 
advanced industrial democracies have been stable for 
decades at levels of around 80% of the population (Dalton, 
1999, 2004; Fuchs et al., 1995; Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 
1999)� If in the 1970’s authors were concerned that democ-
racy may have been at risk because of high citizen discon-
tent with politics (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975; 
Miller, 1974), these worries have now vanished� Support for 
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democratic rule is considered a given fact in North America 
and Western Europe, to the point that the European Social 
Survey −possibly the most important survey monitoring 
public attitudes in Europe− has omitted questions on the 
subject� This does not necessarily mean that citizens in 
these societies are satisfied with the way democracy works 
in their nations: in fact, many advanced democracies show 
remarkably high levels of citizen dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy coexisting with high and stable 
levels of support for the concept of democracy (Lagos, 
2003a)� But it does mean that the democratic ideal has found 
a safe place among the citizens of advanced democracies� 
In newly established and developing democracies 
the picture is quite different� Aggregate levels of support 
for the democratic regime have been found to vary signifi-
cantly across countries and through time (Lagos, 2003a)� 
Support for democracy in these contexts has shown to be 
volatile, as Lagos shows for the Latin American region, 
where it can depend on evaluations of the economic and 
political situations, and partisan and ideological varia-
tions (2003b, 2008)� Support for the democratic regime in 
these societies is not unconditional: there is evidence of a 
strong presence of utilitarian and instrumental reasoning 
influencing citizens’ attitudes towards democracy (Bratton, 
2002; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006, 
2008)� Economical and political performance have shown 
to correlate with citizens’ attitudes (Mishler & Rose, 2001), 
as well as dissatisfaction with the way the system is func-
tioning, discontent with high levels of corruption and a 
perception of general lack of receptivity of the political 
representatives (Diamond, 2002)� Democratic support in 
many of these cases seems to be capturing both deep-rooted 
attitudes and utilitarian calculations: while some citizens 
might be truly convinced that democracy is the best form 
of government in all instances, there is sound evidence 
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showing that an important portion of the publics of these 
countries is only circumstantially expressing support, and 
that their preferences may change in very short periods of 
time (Bratton & Mattes, 2001)�
Hypotheses 
As already stated, contradictory evidence has been re-
cently found regarding the factors that are related to citizen 
support for democracy� At the theoretical level, however, 
there is general agreement that support for democracy is 
a measure of ‘diffuse’ political support, and thus, that it 
should not be strongly related to immediate evaluations of 
the performance of the system or its authorities� Departing 
from this general idea about the nature of democratic sup-
port, this article tests the following three hypotheses in the 
Venezuelan case:
H1: There is no relationship between current economic 
evaluations and support for democracy�
H2: There is no relationship between evaluations of 
the performance of the system and support for democracy�
H3: There is no relationship between trust in the 
President and support for democracy�
To obtain a fuller understanding of the issues at stake, 
two multiple regression models will be specified: the first for 
a ‘traditional’ measure of support for democracy (‘idealist’ 
support, in Mishler and Rose’s terms) and the second for 
a ‘realist’ measure of democratic support� In both cases 
the three hypotheses remain unchanged: support for de-
mocracy, whether understood in an ‘idealist’ or ‘realist’ 
fashion, in theory should not be related to evaluations of 
the economy, of the functioning of the political system, or 
to trust in the President�
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Data
The analyses in this paper are conducted using data from 
Venezuela of the fourth wave of the “AmericasBarometer” 
surveys, conducted by Vanderbilt University’s Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)4 in 2010� In the 
“AmericasBarometer” 2010 round, 26 countries throughout 
the Americas and the Caribbean were included, and over 
36000 individuals were interviewed in total� In Venezuela, 
the project used a national probability sample design of 
voting-age adults, with a total N of 1500 people� It involved 
face-to-face interviews conducted in Spanish� The sur-
vey used a complex sample design, taking into account 
stratification and clustering� The sample consisted of six 
strata representing the six main geographical regions in 
Venezuela: Metropolitan area (capital,) Zuliana, West, Mid-
west, East and Los Llanos�5 
Dependent variables
To examine ‘idealist’ support for democracy in 
Venezuela the classic ‘Churchillian’ indicator is used� The 
question asks respondents to agree or disagree with the 
statement “Democracy may have problems, but it is better 
than any other form of government”� Respondents are given 
a 7-point scale which ranges from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”, and they are asked to choose one point in 
the scale� The assumption is that the more someone ‘agrees’ 
with the statement (gives a higher score in the scale,) the 
4 I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major 
supporters (the United Stated Agency for International Development, the 
United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available�
5 Taken from http://www�vanderbilt�edu/lapop/venezuela/Venezue-
la_2010_Tech_Info�pdf Date of consult: April 8th, 2011� For further 
information, visit LAPOP’s website at http://www�vanderbilt�edu/lapop/�
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more he/she believes in the superiority of democracy over 
other political arrangements�
As Figure 1 shows, at a first glance, support for democ-
racy in Venezuela seems quite high� Over seventy percent of 
the sample chose the higher three answer categories, and 
almost half of the sample strongly agreed with the idea that 
although democracy may have problems, it is the best politi-
cal system possible� A minority of around sixteen percent 
answered in the lower three categories, while only seven 
percent of the sample strongly disagreed with the statement� 
Figure 1. Idealist support for democracy
To assess the second dependent variable analyzed in 
this article, ‘realist’ support for democracy, a question about 
‘support for the political system’ is used� The question asks 
respondents the following: “To what extent do you think 
the Venezuelan political system should be supported?” 
Respondents are again given a 7-point scale which ranges 
from “none” to “a great extent” to express their answer� 
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As in the previous case, the implication is that the higher 
the number they choose as their answer, the more they 
are expressing support for their political system� As said, 
this question is supposed to capture a ‘realist’ version of 
citizens’ attitudes towards democracy, by asking citizens to 
evaluate regimes as they have personally experienced them, 
without referring to “abstract and ambiguous democratic 
ideals” (Mishler & Rose, 2001: 306)�
Figure 2. Realist support for democracy 
(Support for the political system)
The distribution of answers to the ‘system support’ 
question in Venezuela (Figure 2) is completely different 
to that of the ‘support for democracy’ question� The three 
largest groups of respondents are located on three very 
different points of the scale: at the two extremes and at the 
midpoint� This tri-modal distribution implies there is no 
agreement among Venezuelans when it comes to believ-
ing if their political system deserves support or not� This 
type of distribution already suggests that the questions 
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about support for the democratic ideal and support for the 
operating political system are not measuring the same in 
all individuals: some Venezuelans may be in fact making a 
distinction when expressing their attitudes about both issues�
Independent variables
To be able to test the proposed hypotheses for the ‘real-
ist’ and ‘idealist’ measures of support for democracy, seven 
independent variables are included in both regression mod-
els� A first set of variables aims to test hypothesis number one, 
which states that there is no relationship between current 
economic evaluations and support for democracy� For this 
purpose, two questions asking about different economic 
evaluations are used� The first one refers to citizens’ personal 
economic situation and asks respondents “In general, how 
would you rate your personal economic situation?” offering 
five possible answers: “very good”, “good”, “neither good nor 
bad”, “bad” or “very bad”� The second question refers to the 
country’s economic situation and asks “How would you 
rate the country’s economic situation?” having the same 
five answer categories available to respondents�
To test hypotheses number two, which states that “there 
is no relationship between evaluations of the performance of 
the system and support for democracy”, the classic ‘satisfac-
tion with democracy’ question is used as an only indicator� 
This question asks respondents “In general, are you (a) very 
satisfied, (b) satisfied, (c) unsatisfied, or (d) very unsatis-
fied with the way democracy functions in Venezuela?”� As 
the question refers to the functioning of democracy and 
not to the concept of democracy itself, it is supposed to 
tap citizens’ general evaluations of the performance of the 
system (Easton’s ‘specific’ political support)�
To test hypothesis number three, which states that there 
is no relationship between trusting the President and sup-
port for democracy, one indicator is used� It asks “To what 
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extent do you have trust in the President?”� Respondents are 
asked to place themselves on a seven-step ‘ladder’ that of-
fers answers that range from 1 (‘none’) to 7 (‘a great extent’)� 
Finally, a group of social background variables that 
includes gender, age and education level is used for con-
trol in both models� When needed, independent variables 
where recoded from negative to positive to facilitate the 
interpretation of results�
Results
Table 1 presents the multiple regression estimates 
obtained for the model of the ‘idealist’ (‘Churchillian’) 
measure of support for democracy� The numbers reported 
are the standardized (beta) coefficients�
Table 1.- Multiple Regression Estimates for 
‘Idealist’ Support for Democracy
Gender (female) -0,02
Age 0,08**
Education level 0,12***
Country’s current economic situation -0,02
Personal current economic situation 0,02
Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy 0,00
Trust in the President 0,04
N 1397
R 0,13
R² 0,02
Note: Standardized coefficients (β)� Significance level: *p<0,05; 
**p<0,01; ***p<0,001� 
Source: “AmericasBarometer” 2010 - Venezuela (Latin Ameri-
can Public Opinion Project)�
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The variation of responses to the ‘Churchillian’ sup-
port for democracy question is not strongly related to any 
of the variables included in the model� While there are two 
variables that show statistically significant coefficients, it 
would be imprudent to assume these variables have any 
strong substantive relationship to Venezuelans’ preferences 
for democracy� The model accounts for only two percent 
of the variability of answers to the support for democracy 
question, and thus any speculation about possible causal 
effects is, to say the least, adventurous� In sum, variations 
in the degree to which citizens express a preference for de-
mocracy are not being determined by socio-demographics, 
evaluations of general performance of the system, economic 
evaluations, or trust in the President −at least not in the 
terms these variables are included in this model−�
Having clarified this, it is still interesting to look at the 
two variables that have statistically significant coefficients in 
the model� Both of them are socio-demographic variables: 
age and education level� They both show positive, significant 
coefficients, implying that older and more educated citizens 
tend to support democracy more� A possible explanation 
to the positive relationship between age and support for 
democracy is that Venezuelans from older generations have 
experienced dictatorships and thus include comparisons 
between authoritarian regimes and democratic ones when 
answering the survey questions related to the topic� This in 
turn would lead them to show stronger support for democ-
racy than citizens who have never experienced dictatorships 
and cannot make any comparisons� The positive relation-
ship between education level and support for democracy is 
not surprising, as citizens with higher education have been 
found repeatedly to appreciate the virtues of democracy 
more than citizens with lower levels of education (Dennis, 
1966; Evans & Whitefield, 1995)� 
Interestingly, satisfaction with the functioning of de-
mocracy and evaluations of the economy, variables that 
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have been found to correlate with support for democracy in 
developing democracies, show no effect at all in Venezuela� 
It is very saying that the satisfaction with the functioning 
of democracy variable has a coefficient of virtually zero� 
The same is true for trust in the President, which has a 
substantively small, statistically non-significant coefficient� 
All three hypotheses proposed are confirmed for the ‘ideal-
ist’ measure of support for democracy: no relationship is 
found between democratic support and (i) evaluations of 
the economy, (ii) of the performance of the system, and 
(iii) trust in the President� It would appear Venezuelans’ 
preferences for democratic rule are not being affected by im-
mediate policy outputs or attitudes towards the incumbent�
Table 2 presents the multiple regression estimates 
obtained for the model of the ‘realist’ measure of support 
for democracy, or ‘support for the political system’� The 
numbers shown are the standardized (beta) coefficients�
Table 2.- Multiple Regression Estimates for ‘Realist’ Support 
for Democracy 
(Support for the political system)
Gender (female) -0,01
Age 0,02
Education level -0,01
Country’s current economic situation 0,03
Personal current economic situation 0,03
Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy 0,17***
Trust in the President 0,57***
N 1364
R 0,72
R² 0,52
Note: Standardized coefficients (β)� Significance level: *p<0,05; 
**p<0,01; ***p<0,001� 
Source: “AmericasBarometer” 2010 - Venezuela (Latin Ameri-
can Public Opinion Project)�
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The model for support for the political system (‘realist’ 
support for democracy) yields drastically different results� 
The first thing that strikes is the fifty two percent explained 
variation of the dependent variable the model accounts for 
(versus the two percent found in the ‘idealist’ support for 
democracy model)� This means that over half of the varia-
tion of responses to the question of how much Venezuelans 
think their political system should be supported is actually 
explained by the variation of responses to the independent 
variables included in the model� 
Citizens’ economic evaluations, be them of the country 
or personal level, show no relationship at all to Venezuelans’ 
support for their political system� The two dimensions seem 
to be completely unrelated� Hypothesis 1 is confirmed for 
the model of ‘realist’ support for democracy as well: no 
relationship is found between current economic evalua-
tions and support for democracy�
Most, if not all, of system support’s explained varia-
tion comes from two variables: in first place, trust in the 
President, and to a lesser extent, satisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy� Both factors show substantially 
strong, statistically significant coefficients� In this model, 
hypotheses 2 and 3 have to be rejected: the measure of 
‘realist’ democratic support shows strong relationships to 
both (i) evaluations of the performance of the system, and 
(ii) trust in the President�
The seemingly strong relationship between trust in 
the President and ‘realist’ support for democracy is par-
ticularly relevant� Trust in the President shows, with great 
difference, the largest coefficient out of all the explanatory 
variables included in the model� Is this enough evidence 
to conclude support for the political system is strongly 
influenced by attitudes towards Chávez? The Venezuelan 
President occupies a central position in the nation’s po-
litical scene; when speaking and thinking about politics 
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in Venezuela, his figure is without doubt more salient to 
citizens than a general and abstract concept such as the 
‘political system�’ In first instance, it seems safe to argue 
that Venezuelans’ feelings towards Chávez act as a cause in 
determining their attitudes towards other political objects 
rather than as an effect�
A closer look at the relationship between trust 
in the President and support for democracy
How important is the figure of Hugo Chávez in de-
termining Venezuelans’ support for democracy? While 
in the regression analyses no relationship was found 
between trusting Chávez and the measure of ‘idealist’ 
support for democracy, a strong relationship between 
trusting him and supporting the country’s political system 
was observed� What implications do these findings have? 
Venezuelan society has been repeatedly described as 
being polarized around the figure of its President�6 Figure 
3 shows the distribution of answers to the ‘Trust in the 
President’ question in the 2010 “AmericasBarometer” 
Venezuela survey� While more than a quarter of the 
sample responded they feel “no trust at all” towards 
Chávez, an important group of approximately twenty 
percent reported trusting him to “a great extent,” the 
highest answer category possible� Another important 
group of around a third of the sample placed itself in the 
middle categories of the scale (scores 3-5)�
6 The results of the last presidential election of April 14th, 2013, where 
there was an almost equal split of the vote between Nicolás Maduro and 
Henrique Capriles, are a clear sign of the extreme political polarization 
present today in Venezuelan society�
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Figure 3. Trust in the President
To perform a closer examination of the relationship 
between trust in the President and support for democracy, 
the sample was divided into three groups of citizens, de-
pending on their level of trust in Chávez: those with ‘low’ 
trust towards him (scores 1-2), those with ‘intermediate’ 
trust towards him (scores 3-5), and those who show ‘high’ 
trust (scores 6-7)� The three groups resulted very similar in 
size, each being composed of close to a third of the sample� 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of responses to the ‘ide-
alist’ support for democracy question for the three groups 
of ‘trust in the President’ citizens�7 Regardless of where 
citizens situate themselves on the trust towards Chávez 
question, there is a general tendency to support democ-
racy, confirming the null relationship found between the 
7 For the construction of this figure, the ‘idealist’ support for democracy 
question was recoded in the following way: scores 1-2 = ‘low support 
for democracy’, scores 3-5= ‘intermediate support for democracy’, scores 
6-7 = ‘high support for democracy’�
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two variables in the regression analysis� In all three groups 
there is a majority of citizens who express high support for 
democracy; and in the two groups where citizens have the 
most extreme attitudes towards Chávez −low trust and high 
trust− the value is practically the same: a strong 65 percent�
Figure 4. Support for democracy for 3 
levels of ‘Trust in the President’
By introducing the third variable at stake, ‘support for 
the political system’, or ‘realist’ support for democracy, the 
picture becomes clearer� Table 3 illustrates the relationship 
between ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ measures of support for 
democracy for the three levels of ‘trust in the President’�8 
8 For the construction of this table, the support for the system question 
was recoded in the following way: scores 1-2 = ‘low support’, scores 3-5= 
‘intermediate support’, scores 6-7 = ‘high support’�
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At least two well defined groups of citizens can be 
distinguished in Table 3� Close to half (46,8%) of the citi-
zens that feel high trust towards Hugo Chávez also show 
high support for the political system and for the ideal of 
democracy� This group of citizens (which accounts for ap-
proximately 15% of the total sample) could be labeled the 
‘Chavist’ democrats: most likely, they will agree that Chávez 
is a democrat, and that the Venezuelan political system is 
an operating democracy� They find no incompatibilities 
is supporting the ideal of democracy (‘idealist’ support) 
and supporting their operating political system (‘realist’ 
support): for them, democracy is what they are living in 
at the moment� 
A second important group of citizens can be considered 
the opposite: the ‘Anti-Chavist’ democrats, if you will� They 
have remarkably low trust towards the President and low 
support for the political system, but still believe democ-
racy is the best possible political arrangement� They make 
up 40,9% of the persons in the ‘low trust’ group, which is 
equivalent to a 15% of the total sample -a strikingly simi-
lar proportion to the one of the ‘Chavist’ democrats� The 
differences observed here between supporting the ideal 
of democracy and the operating political system could be 
explained through the hypothesis that people in this group 
will most likely qualify Chávez as a dictator and Venezuela’s 
system as a dictatorship� Democracy is something they don’t 
have, it is something desired� Thus, while they express high 
esteem for the ideal of democracy, they will express very 
low support for the operating political system�
Other groups of citizens are also visible� Around a tenth 
of the citizens in the low trust group (close to a 4% of the 
complete sample) have constant negative attitudes towards 
democracy� They do not trust Chávez, do not believe their 
political system should be supported, and have lost faith 
(on never had any) in the ideal of democracy� While it could 
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be hurried to call them ‘antidemocrats,’ they at least seem 
disillusioned� Things are not going well, and democracy, 
which is not working fine, would not help much even if it 
was working better� From this position to preferring the 
presence of authoritarian regimes there is probably not 
much ideological travelling to be done� Another group of 
similar size is the one which shows the same character-
istics but ‘intermediate’ support for democracy� They do 
not trust Chávez, do not express support for their political 
system, but express ‘intermediate’ support for the ideal 
of democracy: they might still have some hope about the 
possibility of a true democracy being able to work things 
out, but they may very well be on their way to complete 
disillusionment�
Conclusions
There is evidence to conclude that there are at least 
two different conceptions of what democracy is among 
Venezuelans� Most citizens express belief in the superiority 
of democracy, but it appears as if some believe democracy is 
what they are living in at the moment, and others believe it is 
something they do not −but would like to− have�9 The pres-
ence of different conceptions of what democracy is opens 
the debate about the validity of the traditional support for 
democracy indicators when used by themselves� Without 
knowing what citizens are referring to when they answer 
9 Hugo Chávez’s death and the changes in the political scenario that have 
recently taken place in Venezuela only reinforce this conclusion� All in 
the name of ‘democracy’, the nation finds itself strongly polarized bet-
ween two opposing forces: Maduro has taken the legacy of the ‘Chavist’ 
conception of democracy, and the opposition, personified in Capriles, 
accuses the current regime of being a dictatorship and demands a ‘true’ 
democracy to be installed�
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questions about an abstract construct such as ‘democ-
racy’, it is very difficult to know what their answers to these 
questions actually mean� In fact, recent literature has cast 
doubts on the common practices used to measure support 
for democracy, which have mostly used a unidimensional 
perspective (Carlin & Singer, 2011; Inglehart, 2003; Schedler 
& Sarsfield, 2007)� The possibility that citizens answer survey 
questions on the topic from multiple perspectives suggests 
that support for democracy is a polysemic concept, and 
that it should be conceived −and measured− as such� This 
implies the need of using several indicators which cover 
distinct dimensions of democratic support�
Trust in Hugo Chávez does not seem to play an im-
portant role in determining Venezuelans’ support for the 
ideal of democracy; where it appears to be significant is in 
defining what democracy is for Venezuelans� As was seen, 
a good proportion of the citizens who trust Chávez seem to 
have a very different conception of what democracy is to 
those citizens who do not trust him at all� While it cannot 
be established with complete certainty, it seems safe to 
argue that the causal effect goes in the direction pointed 
out: at least in some cases, trust in Chávez affects citizens’ 
definitions of democracy, and not the other way around�
As well, due to the multiple conceptions of democ-
racy found among Venezuelans, it becomes problematic 
to consider a heterogeneous understanding of support 
for democracy as a guarantee of stability for the demo-
cratic system� Is the high level of support for the ideal of 
democracy found in Venezuela really a guarantee of sta-
bility for its democratic regime? Or do the different −and 
encountered− conceptions of democracy pose a threat to 
the democratic institutions and regime in general? It may 
be argued in this case that a first glance at the ‘traditional’ 
indicators suggests democracy is not in crisis in Venezuela, 
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but the profound polarization of its society may be in fact 
an indicator of the fragility of its democracy� 
Understanding the differences in conceptions of de-
mocracy is fundamental for any further research seeking 
to unveil what the true levels of support for the democratic 
regime are in different contexts� It seems evident that de-
mocracy does not mean the same for everyone, and thus, 
that the reported levels of support for democracy in many 
cases are not saying what they seem to be saying� In this 
line, it is more relevant for future analyses concentrating on 
support for democracy to ask what models of democracy 
citizens support and not just if they support democracy or 
not� Researchers, policy makers, and scholars in general 
should be sensitive to this if any clear understanding of how 
citizens in developing democracies relate to their political 
regimes is to be found�
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